



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RECONSTITUTION: LEADERSHIP METHODS AND CONSIDERATIONS

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by
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School of Advanced Military Studies
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The conclusion is a discussion of various considerations and methods concerning planning or executing reconstitution operations including the use of current U.S. Army doctrine. The author proposes that tactical units, division level and below, can only conduct reorganization and not regeneration operations. He also recommends that tactical units plan reconstitution as a part of the estimate process. Reconstitution at the division level and below should include reorganization options, as well as rotation of units to maintain an optimal level of combat effectiveness.

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


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
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ABSTRACT

RECONSTITUTION: LEADERSHIP METHODS AND CONSIDERATIONS by MAJ Nathan J. Power, USA, 48 pages.

This monograph discusses the importance of understanding methods and considerations in planning reconstitution operations at the tactical level. It proposes that reconstitution operations are based on planning and the availability of manpower. It also postulates that, at the division level, reconstitution is a leadership not a logistic decision. This monograph examines the methods of reconstituting and shows the importance of advance planning for reconstitution operations.

The monograph first examines historical examples of tactical reconstitution, beginning with the 28th Infantry Division at Schmidt. Other historical examples include the British forces in North Africa, the German SSTK SS Totenkopfdivision on the Eastern Front, the Korean and Vietnamese experiences and the Israeli experience. For each case a review is made of the decision using the method of reconstituting combat power and possible considerations in the unit.

The conclusion is a discussion of various considerations and methods concerning planning or executing reconstitution operations including the use of current U.S. Army doctrine. The author proposes that tactical units, division level and below, can only conduct reorganization and not regeneration operations. He also recommends that tactical units plan reconstitution as a part of the estimate process. Reconstitution at the division level and below should include reorganization options, as well as rotation of units to maintain an optimal level of combat effectiveness.

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks. Napoleon 1

Although Napoleon was not concerned with the same science of logistics and movement factors we have today, he was a master of blending combat leadership decisions with logistics decisions, a skill that remains important. This paper addresses an area where that blend of leadership and logistic decisions is critical. That area is reconstitution. By its nature, reconstitution is both a leadership and a logistics operation. Its importance is clearly evident in the multi-dimensional, non-linear and fluid AirLand battle of the future.

Framing a problem concerning reconstitution requires a common understanding of the terms. The key terms are reconstitution, reorganization, and regeneration. Current doctrine sufficiently provides definitions for these terms and how they interrelate.

Reconstitution is defined as extraordinary actions which are planned and implemented by commanders to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. It may include reestablishment or reinforcement of command and control; cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment, using command priorities to allocate resources; conduct of essential training and reestablishment of unit cohesion. 2

Having defined reconstitution, it is important that the methods used to reconstitute forces are identified. At the tactical level, reconstitution is more closely associated with

reorganization. This affords the unit commander the ability to restore degraded units to a minimum acceptable level of combat effectiveness quickly or temporarily.³ As a method of reconstitution, reorganization is one of the two options open to the commander. The second optional method is that of regeneration.

Regeneration is usually a much more intense logistic operation than reorganization. It requires a detailed plan for the wholesale replacement of personnel and equipment of a unit. Regeneration is concerned with the reestablishment or replacement of essential command and control and the conduct of mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt unit. It can be done either incrementally or in the form of whole unit regeneration.⁴

The 1986 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, discusses the key sustainment functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting and protecting.⁵ The first of these logistics imperatives, manning the force, is the foundation for the others. If a force is not effectively manned, it cannot sustain combat. Although all the sustainment imperatives are important, no force that is not manned can sustain battle. The synchronization of matching combat troops with equipment that is armed, fueled and hurled into the first engagement will not be enough to sustain victory. One noted author identified the problem in this way:

The sheer size of the problem may be gauged from the fact that, on the average, three months of intensive combat in World War II cost an American infantry regiment a hundred percent of its personnel in casualties.⁶

Both the initial and subsequent forces must be manned, and the first and second battles supported if success is to be achieved. Manning the force is a key to reconstitution, and for that reason it will be the major focus of comparison between methods of reconstitution.

THE PROBLEM

The focus of reconstituting combat power at the proper time and place is a tactical leadership decision that must be carefully planned. It is not a logistic decision to determine the time and place to bring forward replacement forces. Not only does leadership play a key part in determining when to employ reconstituted forces, but the manner in which forces are reconstituted is itself a key leadership decision. Commanders must play a primary role in the decision making process. They decide how reconstituted forces will be trained, when units will be reorganized, and how combat power will be regenerated to insure that the right forces will be available at the right time in the right place with the necessary combat power for the second battle. This paper focuses on the tactical methods that lead to the reconstitution of combat power. It will attempt to determine methods the tactical commander can use to reconstitute combat power on the AirLand Battlefield, and factors he should consider in deciding to conduct reconstitution operations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Reconstitution operations take place as the result of decisions at both the operational and the tactical levels. At the corps

level, the commander has the ability to conduct either reorganization or regeneration operations, or a combination of both. At the division level, the commander can reorganize either by redistributing or rotating assets or consolidating the assets he has available.

Effective reconstitution requires advance planning for success. The planning must consider how to bring together the right replacements with the right equipment, at the right time and to the right place. At the corps level, assets are available to move people and equipment to influence operations at the division level. Regardless of the organizational level, the commander must carefully balance the assets he has to influence reconstitution operations. The reconstitution plan must consider both the operational and the tactical aspects of the situation to be successful. Even if we are able to bring troops to the right place at the right time with the right equipment, it may not constitute a deployable force.

At the tactical level, a key piece of the reconstitution puzzle is the leadership decision to reconstitute. The commander must consider both tangible and intangible factors in his decision. The tangible factors may include terrain, weather, loss of key leaders, casualties, and combat support and combat service support available. These are factors that the commander can approach factually when making his decision. Intangible factors might be the morale, esprit, and unit cohesion.

Examples of decisions based on tangible factors include both leader and equipment replacement. For example, this decision may include the replacement of members of the chain of command. Without effective leadership, reinforcements are of limited value. But the commander, making a decision to reconstitute a force, will know which key leaders must be replaced and he can determine the best way to replace them. Another example would be the equipment that they will use must be fueled, loaded with ammunition and ready to deploy. To replace personnel and/or equipment effectively takes planning and leadership to execute the plan in a timely fashion. These are physical or tangible elements that the commander can weigh in making his decision.

Intangible elements are more difficult to weigh in the decision making process. Weighting the intangible elements is based on the commander's overall knowledge of the unit and the personnel that make it up.

The commander's decision is paramount. That is the key to the discussion in this paper. The methodology used in development of that discussion is outlined below.

METHODOLOGY

To provide a background for a discussion of the decision to reconstitute tactically, the following areas will be addressed: reconstitution operations during World War II, reconstitution operations and doctrine during the Korean Conflict and reconstitution operations during the Vietnam Conflict. The

historical evidence will conclude with reconstitution operations conducted by the Israelis.

Each historical study will consider the doctrine of reconstitution at the time of the operation, how the unit was actually reconstituted and the changes in the doctrine as a result of the experience. Because reconstitution operations occur at all levels of organization both the corps and division will be discussed with the focus on the tactical level of war.

Analysis of the operations will consider each historical example and the implications for current and emerging AirLand Battle reconstitution doctrine. This will include current thought as expressed by available regulations and standard procedures. The summary will readdress the two issues to be answered by this paper: The methods a tactical commander will use to reconstitute combat power on the AirLand Battlefield and the factors he should consider in deciding to conduct reconstitution operations

Having defined reconstitution, why it is important, and the methods available for reconstituting forces, the intent is to show that the reconstitution options available to division level and below commanders are limited to only reorganization. At these organizational levels, the commander cannot regenerate combat power without assistance from the corps commander. This constraint must be recognized when the command decision to reconstitute is made. Secondly, what factors does the commander identify in his decision making process and how does he weigh them in reaching a decision to

reconstitute combat force? With this in mind, we begin our journey through the historical experience.

SECTION II: TACTICAL RECONSTITUTION: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Wars are fought and won by men, not by machines. The human dimension of war will be decisive in the campaigns and battles of the future just as it has been in the past.¹

This paper will concentrate on reconstitution operations that have occurred over the past 40 years. As defined by current AirLand Battle Doctrine, "there are three levels of war: low, mid and high."² High intensity conflict is most closely associated with World War II in terms of size and destructiveness. This discussion of the reconstitution operations begins with the experiences captured from both sides during the Second World War.

THE AMERICAN WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE: THE 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT SCHMIDT

The key to reconstitution is manning the force for the second battle. Utilizing this key, American forces in World War II were reconstituted in three ways. At the operational level, individual replacement was used. At the tactical level, reconstitution was accomplished either by reorganization, or limited regeneration.

The operational method of reconstituting using the individual replacement system had an impact on the reconstitution of personnel at the tactical level of war. Under this system, the troops were

moved from one replacement unit to another before ultimately being assigned to a unit.³ The effect of such a system does not have to be imagined since direct evidence is readily available. According to one official account, "some men" complained that they had been "herded like sheep" or "handled like so many sticks of wood". Arriving in the theater after many weeks of travel by land and sea, the men "wanted most of all to be identified with a unit," instead of which they might well spend a few more weeks in various depots.⁴ Replacements were expected to pick up practical know-how from the unit's combat veterans, although the veterans may or may not be willing to teach them. The individual replacement system resulted in units made up of freshly arrived replacements who frequently suffered disproportionately heavy casualties.⁵

Reconstitution at the tactical level was primarily done by reorganizing available assets. Regeneration of combat power was only possible with the assistance of the operational commander. Only limited regeneration efforts were attempted and seldom was regeneration attempted while the unit was in combat. The effects of tactical reconstitution doctrine can be examined more closely by following the exploits of the 28th Infantry Division in the Heurtgen Forest in the late fall and early winter of 1944.

Prior to the battle, the 28th Infantry Division had been rested for one month. They had fought for the previous three months in France on the Siegfried Line. The division was near 100% authorized strength, although many were new replacements. "During offensive operations that occurred in the Schmidt, Germany area

during November 1944, the 28th Infantry Division began the battle with 13,932 cumulative strength.⁶ Cumulative losses for the war to this point were 8,775, including 6,130 battle losses.⁷

This battle took place in the Huertgen Forrest area, in very difficult terrain, concentrating on the Kall River Gorge area. This portion of the battlefield forced troops to use a small unimproved trail for the main route of advance. The weather during the operation was cold with intermittent rain throughout the battle. At times the weather and the rough terrain combined to virtually stagnate the ability of relief forces to attend to the sick and wounded of the advance elements engaged in the battle.

The Battle of Schmidt was planned as a relief action of the 9th Infantry Division in the Heurtgen Forest. As the soldiers of the 28th moved in to replace the 9th, they were impressed by the tired morale of the 9th Division troops. "The men of the 9th Division were so exhausted; so tired that, according to one account, men coming out of the line could not even lift their feet to step over corpses of members of their own units. Instead they stepped on the corpse's face and continued their trudge to the rear."⁸ The depressing atmosphere permeated the entire command, and was apparently known at the 1st Army Headquarters.⁹ This is mentioned to provide some background for the morale of the troops of the 28th as they went into this operation.

During this period, the 28th was in effect one of the only units of the western front that was conducting any offensive actions. They had priority for logistical and air support.¹⁰

The Battle of Schmidt began with elements of the 112th Infantry Regiment capturing Schmidt on 3 Nov 1944. The German counterattack the following morning forced a disorganized retreat by the 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment. As the units retreated to the next position, company leaders halted stragglers and reorganized them to assist in the defense of Kommersheidt. These reorganized groups were integrated into the defense of this village. In some cases, the reorganized companies became understrength platoons.¹¹

On the 14th of November, the arrival of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, followed by the 8th Division on the 19th signalled the relief of the 28th Infantry Division in this battle. On the 14th, the division began to displace toward the Ardennes Forest area for a complete refit.¹²

Regeneration efforts began with the arrival of replacement personnel, issue of some new weapons and after a short period of time, a reassertion of discipline by the leadership of the decimated companies of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 112th Infantry. Division losses during the Battle of Schmidt were estimated at 6,184, including killed, wounded, captured and missing.¹³

As an example of how the American forces conducted regeneration of combat power during the war the following excerpt is included,

Although the division was still considered to be in the front line, the men received training behind their lines as they rotated platoons on line following the formula of two platoons forward, and one back. In early December platoons conducted assault training,

learned patrolling techniques, and gradually became acclimated to life in a combat theater's front line.¹⁴

Implications

The decision to reconstitute the 28th Division and the battalions of the 112th Infantry was made by the division and corps commanders after the Battle of Schmidt ended. What did they consider to make this decision?

The physical factors that were weighed must have included the terrain, weather, casualties and key combat support and combat service support that was available to the unit. Perhaps more important were the intangible factors of unit cohesion, morale and fatigue. Both the tangible and intangible factors relate to each other. The poor weather and difficult terrain, combined with the morale and fatigue of the force impacted on unit cohesion.

The heavy fighting of the 112th Infantry also resulted in a unit that needed refit and reorganization to become an effective combat organization.¹⁵ Reconstitution could not be achieved with the assets of the division alone. In this example the 28th Division could not effectively reconstitute without the assistance and the planning of the corps headquarters. This battle was conducted without advance planning for reconstitution. It does not appear that reconstitution was included in the overall concept of operation of the corps. At the division level of organization, the American forces involved had the capability to reorganize while in contact, but had to be pulled out of the line to regenerate combat power. The responsibility for conducting any reconstitution operation was placed on the division.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AFRICA

The foundation for the British reconstitution system was built on two personnel replacement systems at the corps level, and one method at the division level. The two systems are interdependent. At the corps level, the British had an individual replacement system and also used reserves in reconstituting combat power. The British eventually formed replacement battalions at the corps level to feed replacements forward by specialty rather than just sending bodies forward to fill the gaps created by casualties.¹⁵ At the division level, the method used was that of reorganization.

A blending of the corps and division methods of reconstitution was the establishment of Corps Personnel Camps. These camps were integrated into the overall British replacement system, consisting of General Personnel Replacement Camps for new men coming forward and surplus men from the fighting units during the battle. These camps were also used for the men that were awaiting the repair of tanks by the Tank Delivery Troops.¹⁶

Although the General Personnel Replacement Camps were organized and coordinated by the corps, they were run by the divisions. The arrangement provided for the administration, re-equipping, and regrouping of crews by the divisions.¹⁷ The methods used by the British show a direct linkage of the personnel replacement system to the repair system used to sustain the combat force.

This was the system that fed the tactical forces fighting in North Africa in 1941. The fighting in North Africa, during

November and December of 1941, was conducted by the British Eighth Army under Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery. During this part of the war, the British were in hot pursuit of the German and Italian forces under the command of Field Marshall Rommel and his Afrika Korps. During the heavy fighting in North Africa, combat would be so violent and so brief that the ability of the commander to bring reserve forces into play was negligible, and his ability to withdraw troops for reconstitution of combat power was not very efficient. One subordinate commander stated in his after action report regarding the ability to reconstitute:

In the hard fighting in Northern Tunisia at the end of November and in early December, casualties were heavy, particularly among infantry units and led to urgent demands for reinforcements to be posted to units while the battle was in progress. It was found impossible to withdraw units to refit and reorganize.¹⁸

The situation for the tactical operation had severely strained the logistical tail of the British Army. Montgomery's tactical units were:

stretched out over 300 miles of Egypt and Cyrenaica, and almost all of its divisions were split up because of administrative difficulties (part of the New Zealanders in Bardia, part in Matruh; part of the 7th Armoured Division at El Adem, part in Tobruk; part of 9th Armoured Brigade at Sollum, part at Matruh).¹⁹

The key to the reconstitution of the British forces in North Africa was the replacement of personnel. In November 1941, Montgomery stated that "In all my operations now I have to be very careful about losses, as there are not the officers or men in the depots in Egypt to replace them."²⁰ The Eighth Army and its

divisions were dependent for their entire logistics support on a 450 mile road from Alamein to Tobruk. There was no air transport system as such. 21

As an example of tactical reconstitution, the Battle of Agheila, fought by the 51st Highlander Division is used. The division was on the right, seaward front of the British line, in their pursuit of Rommel along the coast.22 The Division was in good spirit and was near full strength. The weather had been extremely bad the previous week with heavy rain.

On the 13th of December, the 51st Highlander Division suffered heavy casualties when they attempted the attack behind a heavy artillery barrage. Significant losses occurred as the troops were machine gunned and shelled. Many of the losses were attributed to the short period that many of the soldiers had been with the unit. Many of the troops had been with the unit only since the Battle of Alamein. The commander of the division stated that the troops had not been sufficiently trained to fight in this engagement. 23 However the attack was a success. On the 15th, the division began reorganizing, but remained in the front lines as the British continued to pursue the Germans and move on to Tripoli. 24

Implications

In this example the division commander was limited by the corps commander to reorganizing as the only option of reconstituting forces. Only with the assistance of the Corps Personnel Camps was he able to regenerate combat power in the form of equipment that was manned and in a ready-for-war condition. The

decision to tactically reconstitute could not be exercised by the division commander alone but had to be made with advance planning and coordination by the corps commander.

In reviewing the factors that the commander evaluated for a decision regarding the reconstituting of his combat power, the British considered the tactical pursuit of the enemy as one of the driving considerations for reconstituting combat power. They also considered the long line of support and the limited personnel available to reconstitute combat power.

There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the British methods. First, the division commander was limited to reorganization as a method of reconstitution. Secondly, the Personnel Replacement Camps were located in the division rear areas where the corps and division transportation nodes met, providing a somewhat natural waiting area and allowed the divisional rear area support organizations to focus their other sustainment assets. Finally, the operation of the camps by the divisions forced them to take assets away from their units to invest in the training of replacement personnel.

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE

The Germans had three methods of reconstituting combat power. At the national level, the Germans were more likely to equip and man entirely new organizations than to refit older ones that had been decimated in battle. At the corps level and above, reserves were used to replace units that had become attrited in combat, a

rotational method. At the division level, the commander had the option of reorganizing his assets, until he was decimated or rotated out of battle.

Again, the key to reconstitution is the replacement of personnel. The German tactical replacement method was built on an elaborate system for replacements, training and integration into the divisional structure. A better analysis of the complete reconstitution structure can be appreciated if the German Army is studied during the Eastern Front Campaign, before the attrition of the war began to have a deep effect on the ability of the Germans to conduct any type of reconstitution operations.

For the most part the German army was raised on a regional basis. 25. The doctrinal method of sending replacement forces was the "march battalion". 26 After arrival at their unit, the marching battalions stood down and the troops were sent to the divisional field replacement battalion. These battalions had three companies that were identified with the three regiments of the division. This arrangement made it easy for the regiments to take an active part in the training of the recruits and to train the officers with the men they would lead into battle. It should be noted that the longer the war went on the more difficult this elaborate replacement scheme became. The system broke down completely toward the end of the war. 27

The German Army did not have any fixed rules for the rotation of units in and out of combat. The Blitzkrieg campaigns did not require any reconstitution programs, as defined by the west, since

the campaigns were so brief. However, after each campaign, the divisions did take part in "refreshment" or "Auffrischung". This was a process comparable to reconstitution. Refreshment training was a three week retraining process that involved logistic and administrative preparation. Refreshment programs were organized by corps headquarters. The programs reorganized and retrained existing units, merged replacements and issued new equipment.²⁸ The object of this system, or what would be called reconstitution by today's standards, was to restore and preserve the fighting power of the troops.

The German economy was not severely taxed by Blitzkrieg tactics in terms of providing sufficient equipment to the Wehrmacht. However, during the Eastern Front Campaigns, this capability was severely tested. A prime example is the Waffen Schützstaffel Totenkopfdivision (SSTK) (or SS Death's Head Division) in the Demyansk pocket.²⁹ The Totenkopfdivision was regarded by the German High Command as one of the most reliable units on the Eastern Front. "Consequently, during the spring and summer of 1942, Hitler repeatedly refused to allow SSTK to withdraw from Russia for rest and refitting. The result was the piecemeal decimation of the Totenkopfdivision."³⁰

Although Hitler had refused to give the unit the respite that it needed to survive, he did not hesitate to organize additional SS units in Germany. These units, once raised had to be equipped and trained, and were not ready until October of 1942 at the earliest.³¹

The fighting in the Demyansk Pocket exacted a terrible toll on the SSTK Division. The troops had been at the cutting edge of "Operation Barbarossa" since its inception in June of 1941. By September of 1941, despite four months of continuous fighting, the Totenkopfdivision was still on the front line. After the Battle for Lushno, the division reached its lowest strength in the Eastern Front Campaign. The initial request for relief came as the division had suffered over 6,000 casualties. Most of the Division's soldiers were in rags, weak and exhausted, most of their weapons, equipment and vehicles worn out or broken down. The moral fiber of the unit was faltering.³² The ability of the division to survive the intense fighting in the area is a tribute to the fighting ability of the individual soldier.

After repeated requests by the Totenkopfdivision Commander, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Theodor Eicke, and his immediate superior, Colonel General Busch, to Himmler, and directly to Hitler, the Totenkopfdivision finally did receive 3,000 replacements. These arrived in late May, 1942, but further requests for replacements or even sufficient quantities of vehicles and heavy weapons to Demyansk were refused.³³ The replacement system that supported the SS divisions was a little different than that of other German units. In addition to the normal regional recruiting, the SS relied on the concentration camp guards for a portion of their replacements.

By the end of the winter fighting of 1941-42, the total German casualties, excluding sick, numbered 1,167,835 officers and men.³⁴

To conserve fighting strength, the Germans began to look at other methods to save personnel such as lowering the organizational strength of the Infantry Divisions. According to one source, the Germans were forced to tailor their rehabilitation procedures by the Russians on the Eastern Front by April '42:

Some of the army and corps troops as well as the divisions that were to be rehabilitated within the theater could not even be pulled out of the front. They were to be rehabilitated in place., a very unsatisfactory procedure not propitious to raising the combat efficiency of the units.35

A full rehabilitation of German forces could not be conducted before the initiation of the summer '42 offensive. In fact, of the 65-67 divisions that were to participate in the south, only 21-23 were either newly activated or fully rehabilitated behind the front, whereas the remaining 44 divisions were rehabilitated while committed at the front.36

Implications

The results of the German experience of World War II show that they had an excellent system for absorbing new recruits into the divisional structure and it only broke down when circumstances prevented the system from being implemented.

The division commander did not have the ability to choose the method of reconstitution. The circumstances of the campaign in which he was engaged dictated that he only look at reorganization. The division commander had to reorganize combat power based on his own reserves and ingenuity. The unwillingness of the national command authority to allow rotation of the units and orders to

stand and fight left the commanders on the Eastern Front no other choice. Even the corps commanders had little ability to assist in this decision, as rehabilitation of units was usually directed from a strategic or operational level.

Primary factors that the commander considered in making the initial request for relief or refreshment training were the intangible factors of morale and unit cohesion, as seen in the Totenkopfdivision example. However the fact that the division was in for the long fight against the Russian winter and partisans contributed to the decision to request reconstitution.

THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE

During the Korean War, the American methods of reconstituting forces varied with the changes in technology available to the United States. Again the key to reconstituting combat power was the ability to provide the personnel to man the systems. At the corps level and above, the ability to rotate units in and out of the theater of operations allowed the commander to exercise this method of reconstitution. At the division level, the changes were minimal and were centered on the reorganizational abilities of the commander. Regeneration was not possible below the corps level; the assets were simply not available.

The Korean experience was unique because an original concept was proposed. This concept was to swap a deployed division for a fresh one moving into the theater. This made maximum use of the limited transportation assets in the theater. Because of the circumstances involved it was viewed more as a rotation within the

command than an actual relief. In January 1951, the first opportunity to rotate engaged divisions was available to General Ridgeway, the U.N. Command Commander.³⁷

As the rotation developed, the 45th and 40th Infantry Divisions were in Japan for training and to furnish additional security for the Japanese. The plan was to rotate these two divisions with the already deployed 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Divisions. The rotation had strong Congressional support to get reserve forces committed.

However, Gen Ridgeway initially wanted to slow down this proposed rotation and not risk the employment of untrained troops as long as there was any danger of an enemy counteroffensive.³⁸ After some indecisiveness, and some military and political squabbling, the actual transfer began in December, 1951. The first division transfer was to involve the 45th Infantry Division. It was to replace the 1st Cavalry Division. The incoming unit was to be shipped, disembarked and take over the quarters, equipment and weapons of the unit being relieved. This would enable the Theater to use the same shipping assets to move out the relieved unit and would relieve the men from carrying anything but personal arms and equipment.

This system was used for the relief of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions. The plan worked. The rotation went very smoothly and was completed by February, 1952 with a minimum of disruption to the fighting strength of the Eighth Army. The advantage was the deployment of fresh troops into the theater of

operations. The deployment of some reserve divisions signalled to the world American support for the war. The disadvantage had been the trade-off of well-seasoned troops for those that were inexperienced, along with the loss of time by the UN Forces. This time had been used by the opposing Communist Forces to retrench their defenses and strengthen their positions. 39

At the division level, reconstitution consisted of reorganization with existing assets and little regeneration on the part of the commander. However, there was some rotation of units that were on the front lines. A good example is the UN effort in the Heartbreak Ridge area in Fall of 1951.

In an effort to "tidy up the battlefield" and straighten the Eighth Army's eastern front, plan TALONS was developed by Gen Van Fleet. 40 After three days of heavy fighting by the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the US position did not look good. The ability to keep the front-line units supplied with food, water, ammunition, equipment and evacuation of casualties often required that American infantrymen double as carriers and litter bearers. 41

Because of this stalemate, the command group decided to expand the attack with a wider effort with supporting attacks on two other hills. By the 25th of September, these attacks had forced the North Koreans to divert some combat power, but not enough to lessen the pressure on Heartbreak Hill. After two weeks of offensive operations the 23rd Infantry Regiment had taken over 950 casualties, and the division total for the period was over 1,670.

By the 27th of September, the Division Commander, MG Young, and the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Byars, decided that the 23rd lacked the combat power to continue the attack alone. A division attack was planned to maximize the capability of combined arms on the objective, with a coordinated attack by all three regiments of the division. This new operation Code Named "TOUCHDOWN" was to start on 5 October 1951.

The method used for the integration of the new troops and equipment prior to "TOUCHDOWN" was neither unusual nor new. It is representative of the methodology used throughout the Korean Conflict.

Prior to this operation, the Division was augmented with replacements to bring the battalions up to full strength and built up with supplies of food, equipment, and ammunition. The 23rd pulled each of its battalions out of the line for forty-eight hours so that the replacements could be integrated while the unit was in reserve rather than on the line. 43

Implications

In summary, two primary methods of tactical reconstitution were used during the Korean Conflict. Both center on efforts to man the force. The first was rotating the tactical units into the theater. Although, this method was as much an operational method as it was a tactical method, because it was directed by the theater commander, the impact on the divisions was immense. The rotation of units was done piecemeal with a regiment at a time until the complete division was in theater. This method was unique at the time and was possible because of the strategic military resources of the United States.

The second method is reminiscent of the method of reconstituting personnel used during World War II. The rotation of regiments out of the front line as done in the 2nd Division enabled the command to refit and integrate replacement troops into their ranks. It is worth noting that the refitting of the 2nd Division was done with the cooperation and support of the corps in a very short period of time. The corps objective was to achieve a tactical success in the 2nd Division's zone of attack.

Both physical and intangible factors played into the decision to reconstitute forces in this battle. The rotation of forces as directed at the operational level established a precedent for the expectations of all the troops in the theater. Apart from that, there was an overwhelming sensation that this would not be a long war. The troops at the tactical level went into battle with this in mind. During the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, the commander had a limited ability to integrate new troops into his ranks before committing them to combat. Reconstitution at the division level was not planned in advance, but was conducted in an effort to integrate new personnel, and maintain a level of readiness.

THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

As U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War grew, so did its experience in reconstitution. More than in any previous war, the ability of the U.S. to man the force was a critical factor in reconstituting combat power. There were three methods of reconstitution used during this period: individual replacement at the strategic level, rotational method at the corps level and above

and rotation and reorganization at the division level and below. At the corps level, the individual replacement system interfaced with the rotational system used by the division commanders. Divisions would rotate in and out of the field to provide time for the integration of replacement personnel. The division base areas or base camps served as the center of the personnel reconstitution effort.⁴⁴ Below the division level, tactical units still maintained the ability to reorganize internally on an as required basis.

The maturation of the United States involvement in Vietnam was a gradual process. It was not until 1965 that General Westmoreland pressed for a combined corps-level field command, and that was based on an assessment that major field forces would be deployed to Vietnam.⁴⁵ In 1964 there were approximately 16,000 Army personnel in Vietnam. By mid 1966, U.S. Army forces in South Vietnam numbered about 166,000 men.⁴⁶ The gradual build-up of forces coupled with the deployment of individual soldiers on a short twelve month combat tour forced the integration of troops into the combat units to be a continual process.

It was during this initial buildup, in November of 1965, that the Battle of Ia Drang Valley took place. That battle was the first in which the U.S. forces were engaged with a North Vietnamese Regiment controlled by a division level headquarters. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) took the lead in this operation.⁴⁷

In the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Brigade had just rotated to the area, relieving the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. This operation was planned as a routine "Search and Destroy" mission that would begin on the 14th of November with the battalion at only two-thirds strength.⁴⁸

The standard method of deploying forces was to airmobile them into the operation. For this battle the LZ chosen was code named LZ X-RAY. The operation began in mid-morning, and by 1130 the securing operation was complete. While securing the LZ, a platoon-sized enemy force was identified, but interrogation of a prisoner revealed the possibility of three enemy battalions in the area. By 1500 that afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had three companies on the ground. It was faced by 500 to 600 North Vietnamese with more on the way. The Battalion Commander made the decision to ask for an additional rifle company from Brigade Headquarters.⁴⁹ By 1800, the additional company was on the ground in LZ X-RAY. By 1900, the battalion had begun consolidation operations on the LZ. Just before dark a resupply of ammunition, water, medical supplies and rations was flown in.⁵⁰

Throughout the night, 1/7th Cavalry continued to hold the ground around LZ X-RAY despite three night attacks by North Vietnamese forces. Although the battalion had held, the Brigade Commander requested an additional battalion from division be thrown into the fight. The 1st Cavalry Division Commander, MG Kinnard, responded by sending 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry.⁵¹ This request

was based on an overall assessment by the Brigade Commander that the fight for this area was not over.

A second day of heavy fighting left the 1/7 Cavalry with more than a company decimated in the fighting. Total casualties numbered more than one rifle platoon. By the evening of the second day, the Division Commander had decided to extract the 1/7th Cavalry, and to send it to a rear area for two days of rest and reorganization.⁵² A final day of mopping up the area revealed the following statistics for the battle:

American casualties were 79 killed, 121 wounded, and none missing. Enemy losses were much higher and included 634 known dead, 581 estimated dead, and 6 prisoners.⁵³

Implications

The ability of the American commanders to deploy forces rapidly and directly into the the operation changed the parameters of reconstitution. With uncontested air superiority throughout the Vietnam War, the commander could pull out troops or insert them at will. The Ia Drang Valley engagement is an example of the commander influencing the battle using combined arms techniques (combat aviation) in support of reconstitution operations.

The ability of the commander at division and below to call for and receive replacements in a short time using available air assets became commonplace. This reliance on technology allows the commander flexibility in planning reconstitution operations if he has air superiority. As shown in the example, the commander had the ability to call for replacements on an as required basis. They

could be quickly airlifted to the exact point of the battle that he wanted them.

The impact of the individual replacement system on the course of the war is difficult to assess. Decisions made at the strategic level to deploy individual replacements had an impact on the training and employment of these troops at the tactical level. At the tactical level, the division commanders were responsible for initiating training programs to integrate these troops into the force structure.

Still the commander had a limited ability to reconstitute combat power. Although there was a reliance on air power to provide replacement personnel, the commander always had the ability to conduct reorganization operations. Only at the operational levels was the capability retained to completely reconstitute combat power by conducting regeneration and reorganization operations.

ISRAELI EXPERIENCE

The Israeli Army conducts reconstitution operations using two methods. At the corps level reconstitution of combat power is conducted by integrating newly mobilized units into the existing force structure. Doctrinally, corps units do not have the ability to redistribute tactical units.⁵⁴ At the division level and below level, the commander has the ability to reorganize the forces under his command.

The importance of the mobilization efforts and the integration of those elements as they are available for tactical deployment is

apparent given the demographics of Israel. At the start of the 1973 Mideast War, the Israeli Army consisted of three elements: a small professional cadre of officers and NCO specialists, a large number of conscripts, and a trained civilian reserve expected to mobilize with 72 hours notification.⁵⁵ Without mobilization, the trained civilian reserve is not available.

In the 1973 War, the Israelis were initially overwhelmed at their borders by the attacking Syrian and Egyptian units. On the south, the Egyptians overran isolated Israeli strongpoints along the Suez Canal. This border had been defended by the so called Bar-Lev Line of defenses. The Adan Division, commanded by MG Avraham Adan, was the first armored unit to reinforce the collapsing defenses of the Canal.⁵⁶ The importance of the mobilization scheme to the tactical situation was such that Adan only had one brigade deployed at the outbreak of the war, the two reserve brigades would not move out until twelve hours after mobilization.⁵⁷

Within 24 hours of the initial attack, of the 280 tanks operating in the Southern sector, only 110 were operational. This meant that as many as 170 tanks were battle or mechanical losses.⁵⁸ In Adan's division, one armored brigade had only 17 tanks. Survivors of mauled units continued to function and to fight. An example of the attitude of the soldiers in the strongpoints:

Soldiers in the strongpoints were beginning to get used to their grim situation. . . .Our small number of guns was reduced even further because of excessive wear and breakdowns caused by sustained heavy firing. Ammunition was also running out. Eventually only one gun remained in action. The character of the fighting

intangible factors of soldier fatigue, morale and esprit in the face of battle played a part in the ability of the commander to hold out while waiting for replacement personnel.

The Israelis relied to a great degree on the ingenuity of the tactical commanders to reorganize with the assets on hand. At the corps level they did not have the ability to redistribute combat units. The method of reconstitution available at the division level does not include the capability to regenerate combat power, but only to reorganize the forces and equipment at hand. An overriding factor is the necessity of air superiority to reconstitution operations, and pre-planning reconstitution operations prior to the engagement.

SECTION III: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE VERSUS CURRENT DOCTRINE

It is one of the most important tasks of command to effect timely and proper change of tactics according to the conditions of the units and of the terrain, both on the enemy's side and on our own 1 Mao Tse-Tung

Each of the historical examples in this paper identified similarities and differences of reconstitution at each level of war. The attempt has been to identify only those that have a direct impact on reconstitution operations at the division level.

A critical consideration in deciding to reconstitute a unit is the personnel estimate of the unit. This is a leadership responsibility. As Mao, and others have noted, the condition of a unit is an overriding factor in deciding effective tactics. It is

in each strongpoint depended to a large extent on its commander.⁵⁷

Initial efforts at reconstitution were done at division level and below by reorganizing existing personnel and equipment assets. For an example, one battalion commander split his thirty survivors into three subunits. Their missions were to evacuate wounded; to remove weapons and communications equipment from disabled tanks, and to secure the area.⁵⁸ Having completed these operations within forty-eight hours, the unit moved back to the rear for re-arm and refit operations. The Israelis were able to conduct this type of reconstitution operation for two reasons; first, the inability of the Egyptians to press their advance, and second, the air superiority maintained by the Israelis.⁵⁹

As the war continued, a familiar pattern developed in which the Israeli's would refit, re-arm and reconstitute forces under the cover of darkness. Units would pull out of contact near dusk and the supply convoys being pushed forward would move up to conduct logistics support operations. Maximum effort to make the most of the time available led to success of the reconstitution of the Israeli forces.

Implications

In this war, the ability of the Israelis to reorganize and continue the battle until more forces could be deployed certainly assisted in tactical success. The commander's decision to reconstitute was based on tangible factors such as losses of equipment, personnel casualties, and consumption of supplies. The

suggested that reconstitution may be a tactic based on the condition of the unit.

Manning the force is a key to reconstitution. It has been the focus of the different reconstitution examples in this paper. Reconstitution operations are driven by the personnel assets available to the commander. Without sufficient personnel, no reconstitution effort succeeded.

During World War II, every country examined had an individual replacement system. In most of these, the corps provided the interface between the individual replacement and the divisional unit. In the British and the German systems the use of replacement battalions was a part of this interface. However, both of these required the division commander to train these soldiers, and provide leadership for them during the training.

In every American example, the United States Army used an individual replacement system. This system was ". . .based on the belief that both men and machines are interchangeable and can be replaced as individual spare parts without affecting the overall performance of the vast war machine." 2 The U.S. system also fed directly into the tactical units but no regimented training system was available to train the soldiers. The only refinement came during Vietnam when the use of base camps gave the unit the ability to train and integrate soldiers into the unit.

During the Korean and the Vietnamese experiences a new factor entered the decision making process. The ability of the commander to utilize air operations to influence the battle decisively

colored his outlook on the personnel aspects of reconstitution. The decision of the commander to reconstitute or reorganize is based, in part, on the amount of time he perceives that he has to make that decision and still influence battle. Therefore, the leadership decision to reconstitute combat power changes with the time available to the commander to weight and influence the course of the battle. Planning time has a direct relationship to reaction time for the commander.

The decision of how the unit would reconstitute varied but was primarily a matter of reorganization. The decision was always based on the commander's assessment of the personnel condition of his unit. The examples show that the commander would consolidate or reorganize units to improve combat effectiveness.³

Appraising the condition of the unit's personnel is a commander's responsibility. The estimate is based on both physical and immaterial considerations. The most difficult of these factors are immaterial or intangible factors, such as morale, esprit and unit cohesion. If a decision to reconstitute is made, the commander must then weigh the methods available to him.

In 1983, a document produced by the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College entitled "Unit Reconstitution- A Historical Perspective", by Dr. E. J. Drea, identifies the criteria that a commander might use in evaluating unit combat effectiveness.⁴ Nearly all of these criteria weigh heavily on the commander's knowledge of the unit, the personnel that make up the unit and the current physical status of the unit.

A commander removed from the unit has limited knowledge of these factors and would be prone to making a decision based more on estimates than on factual information. A decision based on these criteria should be made by the tactical level commander.

The current U.S. Army criteria for reconstitution is essentially a derivative of the Drea model. The following indicators of combat effectiveness are evaluated on a continuing basis by the commander: personnel status, materiel and combat service support status, combat support status and subjective indicators such as unit leadership, morale, unit history, training, discipline and cohesion.⁵ These factors are then weighted by the commander's evaluation of the condition of the soldiers, (physical and moral), the battle's physical environment, the expectations of the soldiers and perceptions of the soldiers.⁶

One author stated that defining reconstitution under AirLand Battle could not be done, ". . . Until its concepts and doctrine are more fully developed, terms applying to reconstitution will be misused and misunderstood."⁷ However, a new TRADOC pamphlet goes a long way to clear up some of the misuse of the terminology that is involved with the theory of reconstitution.

Nevertheless, our current concept of reconstitution, as discussed in TRADOC Pam 525-51, states that,

Reconstitution is a command responsibility, in that it is a concept that can be used in all theaters, and is adaptable to all levels of conflict intensity at the operational and tactical levels of war, and is applicable at all levels of command.⁸

A key part of this concept is advance planning. This planning has to be general in nature because reconstitution itself is defined as a requirement exceeding average logistic requirements of sustaining the force. It can occur in any type of unit, combat, combat support or combat service support. Reconstitution actions must be planned and executed in a command environment that allows flexibility and initiative. It should be an integral part of the estimate process, and therefore continuous.⁹

To be successful, reconstitution planning should include information on the status of the morale, training and the perceptions of the soldiers at division level and below. This must be clearly understood by both the division and corps commanders. The division commander could provide the estimate of the intangibles and can effect a reorganization plan. The corps commander has the assets available to regenerate combat power in the form of wholesale replacements of both equipment and personnel.

Analysis of the 28th Infantry Division example does not show if the decision to reconstitute was a part of the estimate process. It does show that the execution of the reconstitution operation was slow in developing and resulted in the loss of combat power for a substantial period of time. If the reconstitution operation had been executed by a predetermined plan, it can only be surmised that it would have resulted with less impact on the operational plan for the Huertgen Forest.

The British demonstrated tight control over the replacement system in North Africa. The centralized control over the replacement camps by the British Corps Commander provided the ability to weight reconstitution operations at the corps level as opposed to the division level. The Commander of the 51st Highlander Division did not have control over his reconstitution options, but he could provide an accurate estimate of the needs of his force and more importantly an evaluation of the intangibles that are a part of the reconstitution estimate.

The German example is also one of centralized control over the replacement system. However, the ability of the divisions to effectively train their own replacements, to a greater degree than their Allied opponents, provided a better estimate to the division commander of the capability of his unit to reconstitute. The commander of the Totenkopfdivision did not have the ability to regenerate combat power. He could only to reorganize with his internal assets. He was forced to plan continuously to maintain a level of combat effectiveness based on his tactical situation.

In Korea at Heartbreak Ridge, the 23rd Infantry Regiment was augmented with replacements to bring it to full authorization and was given forty-eight hours to integrate new soldiers into the unit before being recommitted to the battle. Again, there is no detailed estimate process that the commander used to decide to reconstitute. The criteria used by the commander to determine the timing for reconstitution was not based on reports from the

unit, but on rotation of units from the battle to assure that a relative stability in combat effectiveness of the units.

In Vietnam, the commander's ability to influence the battle using air assets gave him more planning/reaction time to influence a particular engagement. In the Battle for the Ia Drang Valley, the commander was able to manipulate combat power quickly to achieve success. The tactical commander was still required to develop his own training plan and integrate these troops into his unit. The criteria for making a decision to reconstitute is difficult to assess in this example because the tactical commander typically influenced the situation before the need for reorganization or regeneration of combat forces was necessary.

The Israeli experience provides an insight in the criteria used when rapid reconstitution cannot be affected using air assets. The key being that air superiority was paramount in buying strategic time for the Israelis.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS

Any serious analysis of the approximately thirty major military engagements that have taken place since World War II must take cognizance of the central fact that the infantry arm has played a dominant, often vital role in the outcome of each. The man with the rifle in his hand and the idea in his head was proved to be one of the most effective military instruments in the last three decades. 1

John A. English

Manpower and manning the system is the key to reconstitution. Advance planning of reconstitution options with the key to manning the system.

Successful reconstitution requires that the tactical commander make a complete and thorough evaluation of his unit. The criteria established for this estimate process place an emphasis on the subjective areas of unit morale, unit leadership, esprit de corps, unit discipline and the perceptions (real or perceived) of the soldiers of the unit. It is imperative that this appraisal be unbiased to be useful. It is the responsibility of the tactical commander to insure that this occurs in the estimate process of the decision cycle.

The estimate process should include reconstitution options. As in past wars, reorganization remains the most valid method of maintaining combat effectiveness. It provides the division commander a means of developing combat power quickly without the need of outside assets. Reorganizing prolongs the combat power of a tactical force even when isolated on the battlefield. However, the decision to reorganize cannot be a substitute for regeneration. It has been shown that the commander at division level and below really only has one option for reconstitution available to him, that of reorganization. A unit that requires more than reorganization to sustain its combat effectiveness, must be reconstituted using the capabilities of support units at corps level and above. If a unit requires regeneration, it will only occur under the planning and direction of the corps commander. The assets necessary to regenerate successfully only exists at corps level and above.

Given this limitation, division units have two options. First, they may concentrate their efforts to planning reorganization schemes that will facilitate the sustainment of combat power. These plans should originate at the tactical level as contingency plans.

Secondly, they may design operations that will allow the rotation of units in combat. Rotation of units and reorganization options should be decided in advance and viewed as complementary solutions to the task of reconstitution. No leader can guarantee that he will always be able to rotate units into combat, but perhaps it can be exploited as a method of maintaining a constant level of combat effectiveness.

Our ability to be successful on the contemporary battlefield will rely on our ability to generate and maintain combat power at the tactical level. The ability to sustain combat power relies on the commanders ability to honestly evaluate his own unit's intangible factors: unit morale, unit leadership, unit discipline and the real or imagined perceptions of the soldiers.

There is no panacea to the decision to reconstitute combat forces. The strength of the decision of how to maintain combat effectiveness derives from the simplicity of the reorganization plan. To exploit the advantages of reorganization and rotation of units successfully, commanders must be sensitized to the value of including these options in the estimate process.

ENDNOTES

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18. Notes from Theaters of War no 16: North Africa, Nov 42-May 43, British War Office, October 43, pg 13.
19. Nigel Hamilton, Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944, (London, England, Hamish Hamilton, 1983) pg. 58.
20. Ibid., pg 73.
21. Ibid., pg 58.
22. Ibid., pg 86.
23. Ibid., pg 87-121.
24. Ibid., pg 88-121.
25. Van Creveld, pg 87. The replacement system used by the Germans was originally designed on a regional basis, i.e. that units the size of divisions downwards were normally composed exclusively of men originating in the same part of the country, and consequently, speaking the same dialect and sharing something of a common outlook.
26. Based on Mueller-Hillebrand, "Personnel and Administration", p. 16, Van Creveld, pg 87. In the German Army, replacements never

traveled as individuals but were organized into 1000 men strong "marching battalions" these units were armed and equiped for fighting tactically, if necessary. Since these men had only been trained in the equivilant of basic training, there was no difference in them as to their specialty knowledge. This provided the divisions to which they were assigned the flexibility to further train them to suit the need of the unit on their arrival.

27. Van Creveld, pg 88

28. Van Creveld, pg 103.

29. Charles W. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1977) pg 235

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32. Ibid., pg 190-200. The third regiment of the division had been decimated by heavy casualties, weakened by three days without food, and hampered by a growing shortage of ammunition, the SS defenders in the second battalion of this regiment, had lost every officer including four successive battalion commanders. On October 24, Eicke was warned by his unit commanders that they only had the strength for fighting from defensive positions. There were for the fist time, signs of apppreciable drop in morale. Moreover, they were on the verge of facing the most difficult of all the Russian challenges, partisans and the Russian winter.

33. Ibid., pg 235. The Totenkopfdivision recieived 3,000 ill-trained reservists from Germany, a few Danish SS Volunteers, some Volksdeutsche recruits from other SS divisions and the return of its own reconnaissance battalion (much weakened) from Staraya Russa.

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36. Ibid., pg 138.

37. Roy B. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (Washington, D.C.), pg 516-517.

38.. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, (Washington, D.C.), pg 202.

39. Ibid., pg 204.

40. Ibid., pg 86. The plan was for the 2nd Infantry Division to push forward with no defined objective, to straighten the boundary, and acquire some high ground in the eastern front of the 8th Army boundary. Augmented with a French battalion, and leading with a single regimental-sized assault force, the Americans were surprised at the voracity of the North Korean resistance to this attack. The hoped for swift penetration of the North Korean defences failed to materialize.

41. Ibid., pg 90.

42. Ibid., pg 92.

43. Ibid., pg 93. The additional firepower provided by coordinating joint operations with the Air Force on the objectives, a better correlation of forces by conducting a three regiment attack as opposed to the earlier piecemeal effort, and the successful integration of fresh troops and equipment eventually led to the success of the operation by the 15th of October.

44. Drea, pg 57.

45. Major General George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies- Command and Control 1950-1969, (Washington, D.C.), pg 52.

46. Ibid., pg 43, 64. This ten-fold expansion, during an eighteen month period, was accomplished through the deployment of complete divisional units, separate brigades, and a support structure to sustain it. These units included the 4th Infantry Division (-), the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 25th Infantry Division (-), the 196 Infantry Brigade, the 1st Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Logistics Command, 1st Aviation Brigade, 17th Aviation Group, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 34th General Support Group.

47. John A. Cash, Seven Firefights in Vietnam, (Washington, D.C.), pg. 3.

48. Ibid., pg 6. The overall concept of the operation was to seek out and destroy enemy forces that had been using Cambodia as a base of operations. For the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, the plan was to deploy all the companies of the battalion on a single landing zone, as opposed to the separate LZs that had been used in previous operations.

49. Ibid., pg 18.

50. Ibid., pg 28.

51. Ibid., pg 28.

52. Ibid., pg 36.
53. Ibid., pg 40.
54. Drea, pg. 53.
55. Drea, pg. 53.
56. Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez, (Presidio Press, New York, 1980) pp 7-10
57. Drea, pg 53.
58. Adan, pg 23-24
59. Drea, pg 54.
60. Drea, pg 54.

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1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford Press, 1963)
2. Drea, Edward J., Unit Reconstitution, A Historical Perspective, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1 Dec 83, pg 62
3. Raymond L. Livingston, "Reorganization During Combat-Considerations for a Mechanized Infantry Company" (Fort Leavenworth: 1985) pg 60. Combat effectiveness is defined as "the units potential to perform assigned missions."3
4. Drea, Edward J., Unit Reconstitution, A Historical Perspective, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1 Dec 83, pg 46-49. The criteria used by Dr. Drea in this article were as follows: condition of soldiers at the onset of the engagement, terrain, weather, soldier's expectations, intensity of the engagement, loss of key leaders, physical condition of soldiers and materiel, casualties, combat support and combat service support expected, isolation of the force (real or perceived), and intangibles such as morale, esprit, unit pride, and unit cohesion.
5. TRADOC Pam 525-51, Military Operations: US Army Operational Concept for Reconstitution on the AirLand Battlefield. (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 4 April 1986), pg 3.
6. TRADOC Pam 525-51, pg A-1
7. LTC Curtis Marsh, "Reconstitution", Military Review, Jan 87, pg 57.

8. TRADOC Pam 525-51, Military Operations: US Army Operational Concept for Reconstitution on the AirLand Battlefield. (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 4 April 1986), pg 2.

9. LTC Curtis Marsh, "Reconstitution", Military Review, Jan 87, pg 57.

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